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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
REBECCA M. JIMINEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11346 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST A TEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from the judgment oI the 
conviction of second degree murder and the trial 
court's denial of motions to suppress and for a new 
trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appella_nt was charged by information with the 
crime of murder in the second degree. Appellant's 
counsel moved to suppress any and all statements 
made by the defendant at her interrogation. The 
Court denied defendant's motion. The defendant 
was tried by jury for the crime of second degree 
murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and de-
2 
fendant moved for a new trial. The motion was 0, 
nied and deiendant was sentenced to the Utah Sta;. 
Prison. .. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a determination by the Cour 
of whether the appellant's confession was made dur 
ing custodial interrogation. If the Court conclude: 
that it was not so made, respondent seeks affirmanc: 
of the conviction. If the Court finds the confessior 
to have been madE· during custodial interrogatior. 
respondent seeks reversal of the judgment of cor 
viction, vacation of the denial of respondent': 
motions for new trial and to suppress her confe&, 
sion, and remand for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Near the hour of midnight on January 14, 1960 
Salt Lake City police officers arrived at an apartmeri 
at 852 South West Temple to investigate a repor 
that a man had been injured. Upon their arrival, they 
found the body of Manuel Ray Jiminez on a bed. 11. 
connection with the investigation of the death, a~ 
pellant was taken to Salt Lake City Police Headquar· 
ters shortly before 12:30 a.m. on January 15 (R.57). 
Officer Elton testified that at the time he arrived a: 
the apartment, appellant was "visibly upset" (R.45) 
and that at this time she was a "suspect" in the cas"' 
~R.37). 
At :he police station, appellant was questioned 
3 
3t three different times between the hours of 1 :30 
a.m. and 4:00 a.m. (R.267-271). During the first inter-
rogation period, Officers Cahoon and Wesley were 
present with the appellant, who was otherwise alone 
in the interrogation room CR.267). Before any quest-
ioning began, Officer Cahoon advised appellant 
that she had the right to remain silent, that any state-
ments she might make could be used against her 
and that she could consult with an attorney (R.51,67). 
Officer Cahoon testified that appellant was "not spec-
ifically" under suspicion at the time of the first inter-
rogation <R.51), which lasted for 25 to 30 minutes 
(R.58). The record does not disclose the nature of the 
questions asked, nor the responses given during the 
first period of questioning, but there is testimony that 
appellant's account of the events earlier that evening 
was fraught with "discrepancies" (R.269). 
The second interrogation began at some time 
between 2:30 a.m. and 3: 15 a.m. (R.54,269), and lasted 
from ten (R.58) to 25 minutes (R.271). During this 
questioning period, Officers Cahoon, Shields, Elton 
and Wesley were present with the defendant in the 
interrogation room (R.54). There is testimony that·at 
this time, appellant was "under suspicion" of having 
killed the deceased (R.51,61), and that the purpose of" -
questioning her a second time was to investigate 
"several discrepancies'' in appellant's statement dur-
ing the first period of questioning (269). The officers 
discussed with appellant the possibility of her in-
volvement in the crime (R.60), and questioned her 
reqarding what appeared to be blood stains on her 
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skirt and nails (H.66). Appellant was asked to submit 
to a sample scraping of her nails (R.54), but this was 
not done until the third questioning period (R.292). 
During this second interrogation, appellant implicat-
ed another man in the killing (R.54). She was then 
asked to submit to a polygraph test, but refused (R. 
66). As a result of the second period of questioning, 
another officer was sent back to the apartment build-
ing to recover a knife suspected to have been used 
to stab the deceased (R.271). 
The third interrogation period began "around 
4:00 a.m." and lasted only a short time (R.58,271). Of-
ficers Shields and Cahoon were present with appel-
lant, who was then the "sole suspect" in the case 
(R.55,51). Again the blood stains on appellant's skirt 
and nails were discussed, and Officer Cahoon took 
a sample scraping from appellant's nails (R.292). Of-
ficer Cahoon then left the interrogation room, where-
upon appellant confessed to having stabbed the de-
ceased, and described the events surrounding the 
stabbing (R.292). Appellant was then formally placed 
under arrest (R.240). When asked if she would give 
a signed statement she refused, stating that she warit-
ed to see an attorney, whereupon the questioning 
ceased and an attorney was called for her (R.300). 
Other relevant portions of the record disclose 
that at some time prior to the confession, appellant 
stated that she didn't wish to have counsel (R.63). It 
also appears that the officers, prior to questioning 
her, told her that if she was tired, she could lie down, 
and that she could go to the fodies room if necessary 
(R.66). She was given a cup of coffee (R.66). Appel-
lant's son-in-law was present at the police station, 
but it does not clearly appear in the record that ap-
pellant ever reque~ted to see him (R.64). Officer Ca-
hoon testified tha.t appellant could have left the pol-
ice station at any time prior to formal arrest (R.282). 
Finally, with respect to the warnings given ap-
pellant, the record shows that, while the appellant 
was warned of her right to remain silent, that any-
thing she might say _could be used against her, and 
that she could consult with an attorney (R.51,67,82), 
she was at no time prior to making incriminating 
statements advised that if she could not afford an 
attorney one would be appointed in her behalf. In-
deed, two of the interrogating officers testified 
that no such warning was given (R.63,88). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO CUSTOD-
IAL INTERROGATION PRIOR TO CONFESSING TO 
THE CRIME. 
This case presents an important issue of consti-
tutional dimensions in the administration of the prin-
cipiles announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). It is the respondent's position that there is 
here presented a single question for determination 
by this Court, viz., whether appellant was undergo-
ing "custodial interrogation" at the time she confess-
ed to the crime and related the attendant details to 
pclice officers. It is not questioned that the full comp-
lement of warnings required by Miranda were not 
given to appellant, nor that her confession was ad 
mitted at trial in evidence against her over a time-
1 y objection and motion to suppress (R.115). Further 
even though the record discloses that appellant indi-
cated prior to her confession that she did not wish 
to have an attorney, no effective waiver of her rights 
was ever made, for Miranda makes it clear that one 
cannot waive right~, of which he has not been fully 
advised, 384 U.S. at 479. Accordingly, the case is re-
duced to an examination of the surrounding circum-
stances in order to determine whether appellant's 
confession was made during "custodial interroga-
tion" within the purview of Miranda. 
We must begin with Miranda itself, where the 
court spoke of "custodial interrogation" in the fol-
lowing terms: 
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a per-
son has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way. This is what we meant in Escobedo when we 
spoke of an investigation which had focused on an 
accused. 384 U.S. at 444 & id., n. 4. 
\Afhile it seems clear that one who has been ar-
rested or physically restrained is within "custody" 
for the purposes of Miranda, Lathers v. U.S., 396 F.2d 
524 (5th Cir. i 968), People v. McKay, 29 App.Div.2d 
834, 287 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1968), the unfortunate-
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ly imprecise formulation contained in the phrase 
"otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way" has created difficulty in the ad hoc 
decision of cases v.rhere there has been no formal 
3.rrest or actual physical restraint. Indeed, the legacy 
uf Miranda has been a growing volume of cases 
turning on this single point. The case at bar is the 
first in our state to join ranks with such decisions. 
The cases which have dealt with the problem 
here presented indicate that the place of questioning 
is perhaps the most significant fact in determining 
whether incriminatory or exculpatory statements 
were made during custodial interrogation. General-
ly, it may be said that interrogation which takes place 
in a police station will be found to have been cust-
odial, Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 
1968); U.S. v. Harrison, 265 F.Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967); Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa 53, 239 A.2d 
416 (1968); People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc.2d 925, 277 
N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966), and the four cases decid-
ed in Miranda involved police station interrogations, 
384 U.S. at 491, 493, 495, 497. In a dictum, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has said that cus-
todial interrogation "certainly includes all station-
house or police car questioning by the police for 
there the 'potential for compulsion' is obvious." U.S. 
v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 173, 376 (4th Cir. 1968). Yet there 
are cases which disprove the broad assumption 
ma_de in Gibson. For example, station-house quest-
ioning was found not to amount to custodial inter-
rogation in People v. Williams, 56 Misc.2d 837, 290 
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N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1968). There, a police offic, 
had been questioned at the station-house regardin 
the whereabouts of his automobile at the time• 
crime had been committed. On the basis tha1 ft 
could not reasonably have believed himself to hav, 
been restrained, the court held that his statemen~ 
given during interrogation were admissible despi'-
that Miranda warnings had not been given. Andi: 
Campbell v. State, 4 Md.App. 448, 243 A.2d 643 (19o1 
statements made by a defendant in a police car afle:' 
arrest were held not to have been made durir 
custodial interrogation. See also State v. Travis, .... 
Ore. _______ , 441 P.2d 597 (1968) (questioning in polic: 
car held not custodial interrogation). 
Other cases jndicate that the Miranda warning: 
may apply to questioning which takes place othe: 
than at the police station. See, e.g., Windsor v. m., 
389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) (defendant's hotel room) 
U.S. v. Turzynski, 268 F.Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967)(dr 
fendant's clinic); Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534, 24[ 
A.2d 288 (1968) (police car); State v. Ross, 183 Neb. 1 
157 N.W.2d 860 (1968) (defendant's hospital room: 
Commonwealth v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 235 A.Zd 3~' 
(1967) (defendant's home); Commonwealth v. Jeffer· 
son. 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 ( 1967) (hospital corr 
dor). 
The greatest number of reported cases, how 
ever, have found that questioning which took placf 
somewhere other than the station-house was nc 
"custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Mu 
\
, . 
. , 
Cf 
1C 
lu 
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anda. A list of these cases appears in the Appendix, 
infra. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the place where 
questioning occurs is not absolutely determinative 
of the question of custodial interrogation; rather, the 
entire circumstances surrounding the questioning 
must be taken into account. See People v. P., 21 N.Y. 
2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967). 
In at least three American jurisdictions, the 
question of custodial interrogation appears to in-
volve not only the place of questioning, but the de-
fendant's reasonable belief vel non that he is 
deprived of his freedom of action. Thus, the court in 
People v. Ha~el, 60 Cal. Reptr. 437, 252 Cal.App.2d 
412 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) stated: 
(C)ustody occurs if a suspect is led to believe, as a 
reasonable person, that he is being deprived or re-
stricted of his freedom of action or movement 1 . mder 
pressures of official authority ... (T)he custody re-
quirement of Miranda does not depend on the sub-
jective intent of the law enforcement officer-interro-
gator but upon whether the suspect is physically 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way or is placed in a situation in which he reason-
ably believes that his freedom of action or move-
ment is restricted by such interrogation. 60 
Cal.Rptr. at 440. (Emphasis added.) 
This rationale was adopted by the Maryland 
court in Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534, 240 A.2d 
(1968) and by the New York Court of Appeals in 
Peo.ple v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967). 
10 
Let us examine the circumstances in the instant 
case. It is respondent's contention that there are facts 
of record which show that appellant's confession 
was not made during custodial interrogation. At the 
time she confessed, appellant was not under arrest; 
in fact, one of the officers testified that he could not 
have prevented appellant from leaving had she 
wished to go. In addition, the "incommunicado" at-
mosphere of which Miranda speaks was not present 
here, for the record shows that appellant was given 
an opportunity to rest, to go to the ladies' room, and 
to drink a. cup of coffee. And there is nothing to 
shovv a deliberate design by the police to prevent 
appellant from speaking with her son-in-law, who 
was present at the station. Indeed, a reading of the 
entire record discloses a conscious effort on the part 
of the police to make appellant as comfortable as 
possible under the circumstances. Further, no 
lengthy questioning occurred here, and as soon as 
appellant expressed a wish to see her attorney, the 
questioning stopped. Finally, the record contains 
nothing which indicates that the officers employed 
coercive tactics of either an overt or a covert nature. 
CONCLUSION 
The case at bar admittedly presents a difficult 
c:ruestion. anr:l the respondent is aware of the policies 
v:rhich mav be asserted in support of appellant's 
position. But equally compelling a.re the policy argu-
ments in favor of affirming the conviction herein. A 
distinguished jurist, dissenting in a case much like 
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the case at bar, has made an eloquent appeal in sup-
port of the position respondent here asserts. Com-
monwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 52, 239 A.2d 416, 419 
(Musmanno, J., dissenting). However, the respond-
ent is also a.ware of its fundamental duty to assure 
the just administration of the law: 
The U.S. Attorney is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereign 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compel-
ling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done. Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). (Opin-
ion by Sutherland, J.) 
Recognizing this obligation, and mindful of the 
societal interests here in conflict, respondent re-
spectfullv submits to this Court the difficult question 
of whether appellant's confession was made during 
custodial interrogation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
